Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a Guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management - CACM (Regulation on market coupling or 'CACM Guideline'), Articles 2(44), 69 - 72, 79, Recital 23
‘firmness’ means a guarantee that cross-zonal capacity rights will remain unchanged and that a compensation is paid if they are nevertheless changed
Firmness of allocated cross-zonal capacity
Proposal for day-ahead firmness deadline
By 16 months after the entry into force of this Regulation, all TSOs shall develop a common proposal for a single day-ahead firmness deadline, which shall not be shorter than half an hour before the day-ahead market gate closure time. The proposal shall be subject to consultation in accordance with Article 12.
Firmness of day-ahead capacity and allocation constraints
1. Prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline, each coordinated capacity calculator may adjust cross-zonal capacity and allocation constraints provided to relevant NEMOs.
2. After the day-ahead firmness deadline, all cross-zonal capacity and allocation constraints shall be firm for day-ahead capacity allocation unless the requirements of Article 46(2) are met, in which case cross-zonal capacity and allocation constraints shall be firm as soon as they are submitted to relevant NEMOs.
3. After the day-ahead firmness deadline, cross-zonal capacity which has not been allocated may be adjusted for subsequent allocations.
Firmness of intraday capacity
Cross-zonal intraday capacity shall be firm as soon as it is allocated.
Firmness in the event of force majeure or emergency situations
1. In the event of force majeure or an emergency situation referred to in Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, where the TSO shall act in an expeditious manner and redispatching or countertrading is not possible, each TSO shall have the right to curtail allocated cross-zonal capacity. In all cases, curtailment shall be undertaken in a coordinated manner following liaison with all directly concerned TSOs.
2. A TSO which invokes force majeure or an emergency situation shall publish a notice explaining the nature of the force majeure or the emergency situation and its probable duration. This notice shall be made available to the market participants concerned through NEMOs. If capacity is allocated explicitly to market participants, the TSO invoking force majeure or an emergency situation shall send notice directly to contractual parties holding cross-zonal capacity for the relevant market time-frame.
3. If allocated capacity is curtailed because of force majeure or an emergency situation invoked by a TSO, the TSO shall reimburse or provide compensation for the period of force majeure or the emergency situation, in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) if there is implicit allocation, central counter parties or shipping agents shall not be subject to financial damage or financial benefit arising from any imbalance created by such curtailment;
(b) in the event of force majeure, if capacity is allocated via explicit allocation, market participants shall be entitled to reimbursement of the price paid for the capacity during the explicit allocation process;
(c) in an emergency situation, if capacity is allocated via explicit allocation, market participants shall be entitled to compensation equal to the price difference of relevant markets between the bidding zones concerned in the relevant time-frame; or
(d) in an emergency situation, if capacity is allocated via explicit allocation but the bidding zone price is not calculated in at least one of the two relevant bidding zones in the relevant time-frame, market participants shall be entitled to reimbursement of the price paid for capacity during the explicit allocation process.
4. The TSO invoking force majeure or an emergency situation shall limit the consequences and duration of the force majeure situation or emergency situation.
5. Where a Member State has so provided, upon request by the TSO concerned the national regulatory authority shall assess whether an event qualifies as force majeure.
Costs of ensuring firmness
The costs of ensuring firmness in accordance with Articles 70(2) and 71 shall be borne by the relevant TSOs, to the extent possible in accordance with Article 16(6)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. These costs shall include the costs from compensation mechanisms associated with ensuring the firmness of cross-zonal capacities as well as the costs of redispatching, countertrading and imbalance associated with compensating market participants.
Any costs incurred efficiently to guarantee firmness of capacity and to set up processes to comply with this Regulation should be recovered via network tariffs or appropriate mechanisms in a timely manner. NEMOs, including in performing MCO functions should be entitled to recover their incurred costs if they are efficiently incurred, reasonable and proportionate.