Network Code on Forward Capacity Allocation (FCA), Articles 53-56, 61, Recitals 11, 12
Firmness of allocated cross-zonal capacity
General firmness provisions
1. All TSOs shall be entitled to curtail long-term transmission rights to ensure operation remains within operational security limits prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline. Where TSOs curtail long-term transmission rights, they shall report this to the respective regulatory authorities and also publish the factual reasons that lead to the curtailment.
2. The concerned TSOs on the bidding zone border where long-term transmission rights have been curtailed shall compensate the holders of curtailed long-term transmission rights with the market spread.
Definition of caps
1. The concerned TSOs on a bidding zone border may propose a cap on the total compensation to be paid to all holders of curtailed long-term transmission rights in the relevant calendar year or the relevant calendar month in case of Direct Current interconnectors.
2. The cap shall not be lower than the total amount of congestion income collected by the concerned TSOs on the bidding zone border in the relevant calendar year. In case of Direct Current interconnectors, TSOs may propose a cap not lower than the total congestion income collected by the concerned TSOs on the bidding zone border in the relevant calendar month.
3. In case of several interconnectors operated by different TSOs on the same bidding zone border and subject to different regulatory regimes overseen by regulatory authorities, the total congestion income used for calculation of capped compensation pursuant to paragraph 2 may be dissociated between each interconnector. Such a division shall be proposed by the concerned TSOs and approved by the competent regulatory authorities.
Where TSOs propose to apply a cap referred to in Article 54, they shall jointly propose a set of compensation rules with regard to the applied cap.
Firmness in the event of force majeure
1. In the event of force majeure, TSOs may curtail long-term transmission rights. Such curtailment shall be undertaken in a coordinated manner following liaison with all TSOs directly affected.
2. The TSO which invokes the force majeure shall publish a notification describing the nature of the force majeure and its probable duration.
3. In the event of curtailment due to force majeure the concerned holders of long-term transmission rights shall receive compensation for the period of that force majeure by the TSO which invoked the force majeure. In this case, the compensation shall be equal to the amount initially paid for the concerned long-term transmission right during the forward allocation process.
4. The TSO which invokes a force majeure shall make every possible effort to limit the consequences and duration of the force majeure.
5. Where a Member State has so provided, upon request by the TSO concerned, the national regulatory authority shall assess whether an event qualifies as force majeure.
Cost of ensuring firmness and remuneration of long-term transmission rights
1. The cost of ensuring firmness shall include costs incurred from compensation mechanisms associated with ensuring firmness of cross-zonal capacities as well as the cost of re-dispatching, countertrading and imbalance associated with compensating market participants and be borne by TSOs, to the extent possible in accordance with Article 16(6)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009.
2. When fixing or approving transmission tariffs or other appropriate mechanism in accordance with Article 37(1)(a) of Directive 2009/72/EC, and having regard to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, regulatory authorities shall consider compensation payments as eligible costs provided that they are reasonable, efficient and proportionate.
3. Within six months after the approval of the methodology for sharing congestion income referred to in Article 57, all TSOs shall jointly develop a methodology for sharing costs incurred to ensure firmness and remuneration of long-term transmission rights. This methodology shall be consistent with the methodology for sharing congestion income from forward capacity allocation as referred to in Article 57.
Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishes a day-ahead firmness deadline and a related compensation regime for long-term transmission rights curtailed after such deadline. Similarly, long-term transmission rights curtailed before the day-ahead firmness deadline should be reimbursed or compensated by TSOs to the long-term transmission rights holders.
Caps on the compensation to be paid to holders whose long-term transmission rights have been curtailed before the day-ahead firmness deadline may be introduced, taking into the account the liquidity of the relevant markets and the possibility for market participants to adjust their positions.